216 definitions
Plato: top 300 quotes
216 definitions
The Philosopher (n.) is a lover of the vision of truth.
The Philosopher (n.) desires to discern the truth.
A Philosopher (n.) is a lover of wisdom, but one cannot be a lover of wisdom if wisdom does not love him in return.
The Philosopher's (n.) speciality is dissuasion, or refutation just as the rhetorician's specialty is persuasion.
The Philosopher (n.) is tasked to make others good, and allow that others will make still others good, without ever determining in what they are to be good.
Time (n.) is that eternal thing which temporal events are oriented towards.
Time (n.) is the moving imago of the unmoving eternity.
Time (n.) is a 'moving image of eternity', distinguishing between eternal time which 'rests in unity' and the time of 'those states which affect moving and sensible things of which generation is the cause'.
Time (n.) is itself a kind of clock, not just the passage of events, but a standard by which that passage can be measured.
Justice (n.) is minding one's own business and not meddling with other men's concerns.
Justice (n.) is nothing more than the advantage of the stronger.
Justice (n.) is at the intersection of the question 'is justice good in itself, or is the fear of retribution our only reason to be just'.
Justice (n.) is having and doing what is one's own.
Justice (n.) is performing that task for society which is in accordance with one's natural abilities.
Justice (n.) is possible in the state only as first it resides in the hearts and souls of the citizens.
Justice (n.) is related to duties. It is a spiritual virtue of individuals, and of one's inner self and comes down to the performance of one's duties to the best of one's abilities and capacities.
Justice (n.) is no more than lively fear that our belongings will be taken away
Justice (n.) is never able to be directly seen, only embodied in imperfect instances of itself.
Justice (n.) is effective coordination in a society.
Justice (n.) is effective coordination, the harmonious functioning of the elements - either in a man or in a society, each in its fit place and each making its cooperative contribution to behavior.
Justice (n.) is “the having and doing what is one's own," which means that each man shall receive the equivalent of what he produces, and shall perform the function for which he is best fit.
Justice (n.) is not the right of the stronger, but the effective harmony of the whole.
Justice (n.) is not mere strength, but harmonious strength—desires and men falling into that order which constitutes intelligence and organization.
Justice (n.) is always determined based on what serves the interests of the government who lays down the laws. (Thrasymachus)
Justice (n.) is the interest of the stronger. (Thrasymachus)
Thinking (n.) is the talking of the soul with itself.
Thinking (n.) is a dialogue which the soul holds with itself about its object with the aim of constructing a sententially formulated opinion to be tested in dialogue with others.
Thinking (n.) is a kind of doing that is no different than any other kind of activity demanding skill and abilities, practice, and experience gained over time.
Thinking (n.) is a language, a conversation with oneself.
Thinking (n.) is the achievement of truth through careful division or separation of ideas and things.
Being (n.) is the least meaningful predicate of all, because it is the one that has the greatest extension. His concern is with the good beyond being.
Mathematics (n.) is not only the mediator between the ideas and the things of sense... the mathematical order is the true account of the nature of reality.
Mathematics (n.) is a proof of the existence of an immortal soul, because mathematical theorems are not obtained from experience and so must accompany the soul into existence.
Mathematics (n.) is like checkers in that it is suitable for the young, not too difficult, amusing, and without peril of the state.
Love (n.) is a serious mental disease.
Love (n.) is an intermediate state between possession and deprivation.
Love (n.) is of the qualities that are recognized as good, rather than for the person in whom those qualities are instantiated. Love for one's beloved is for the utility that the beloved can provide in delivering to the lover the happiness that is the driver of love.
Love (n.) is the joy of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the Gods.
Love (n.) is a serious form of madness.
Art (n.) is all about mimesis, imitation of reality (which itself is an imitation of the transcendent realm) and thus it is but a copy, and its value is thus, that of a dubious imitation of an imitations.
Art (n.) is neither particularly useful (the painting of a bed is no good to sleep on), nor, in the strict sense, true.