The Cogito (n.) must be our point of departure — but it leads us only on condition that we get out of it.
The Cogito (n.) is the one absolute truth from which the probable must hang: to define the probable one must possess the true.
The Cogito (n.) must be able to accompany all my representations — which only proves there are moments when it does not.
The Cogito (n.) is the consciousness that says "I think", which is precisely not the consciousness which thinks.
The Cogito (n.) turned to horror says I exist because I think, and I can't stop thinking: if I exist, it is because I am horrified at existing.
The Cogito (n.) discovers not only oneself but others too: saying "I think" I reach myself in the presence of the other, just as certain of him as of me.
The Cogito (n.) is impure: it shows an I on its horizon only because Descartes reached it through doubt and the ambition to advance science — enterprises of an I.
The Cogito (n.) is, contrary to both Descartes and Kant, entirely intersubjective. That is, when we say 'I think' we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence.