Promise (n.) are kept because of government, not government obeyed because of promises: without its sanction, promises would have little force in a large society.
A Promise (n.) soon comes to consist wholly of its words — a man is bound though he secretly withholds his intention, yet not bound if he speaks in evident jest.
A Promise (n.) is the sanction of the interested commerce of mankind: a form of words by which a man stakes his right ever to be trusted again.
A Promise (n.) cannot ground obedience: ask why we must keep our word and the only answer — society needs it — would have explained obedience directly, without the detour.
A Promise (n.) would be as mysterious and incomprehensible an operation as transubstantiation or holy orders, if its obligation sprang from the will.
A Promise (n.) would be idle where love was already strong: why bind another by a deed or promise to do me good, when he is already prompted by the strongest inclination to seek my happiness?
A Promise (n.) is naturally unintelligible: it would mean willing a new obligation — a new sentiment — and we can no more change our sentiments by will than the motions of the heavens.