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Good (n.) and ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠evil are the sole objects of practical reason: the good a necessary object of desire, the evil of loathing, both according to a principle of reason.

Good (n.) grounded ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠in pleasure would never be good in itself but only good for something: the good would always be merely the useful, its end lying outside the will in sensation.

Good (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not the agreeable, nor evil the disagreeable — language itself demands that good and evil be judged by universally communicable concepts, not by private sensation.

Good (n.) or ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠evil in the absolute sense can belong only to a way of acting, a maxim, and hence to the person himself — never to a thing.

Good (n.) does ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not ground the moral law; the paradox of method is that the moral law first determines and makes possible the concept of the good.