The Moral law (n.) sits beside Kant's starry heavens for a good psychological reason: the same parent who gave the child life and protection also taught it what to do and leave undone.
The Moral law (n.) is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom: without first hearing the law in our reason, we would never dare to assume we are free.
The Moral law (n.) is strange and has no equal: a merely problematic thought of possible universal legislation is commanded unconditionally, borrowing nothing from experience or any external will.
The Moral law (n.) gives us no prospect, but a fact inexplicable from the whole world of sense — one that points to, and even lets us cognize, a pure world of understanding.
The Moral law (n.) transfers us, in idea, into a nature in which pure reason, if it had the physical power, would produce the highest good.
The Moral law (n.) is a law to which all our maxims are subject as if through our will an order of nature must at the same time arise.
The Moral law (n.) is apodeictically certain even if no example could be hunted up in experience where it is complied with exactly.
The Moral law (n.) cannot be deduced, yet paradoxically serves to deduce something else — freedom, an inscrutable power no experience could prove.
The Moral law (n.) converts reason's transcendent use into an immanent one — reason, which always became extravagant when it speculated, here becomes, through ideas, an efficient cause in experience.
The Moral law (n.) has no schema in intuition, so understanding lends it a type: the law of nature, used only for its form.
The Moral law (n.) works on us first only negatively: its effect as an incentive is the damage it does to our inclinations.
The Moral law (n.) gains weight not by adding anything but by taking away: it strips self-love of its influence and self-conceit of its delusion, and the counterweight's removal is the law's weight.
The Moral law (n.) gets degraded into a rule of well-understood advantage for one reason: we want to be rid of the intimidating respect that holds our unworthiness so sternly before us.
The Moral law (n.) is one law with two faces: for a perfect will it is a law of holiness, for every finite will a law of duty.
The Moral law (n.) is a fact that must be shown in the judgment of the commonest reason before any science may touch it; principles here are the first data, and cannot come out of science.
The Moral law (n.) is the principle of morality, which does not need to be searched for or invented; it has been in the reason of every human being all along, part of their very essence.
The Moral law (n.) without the thought of endless progress gets either softened into something indulgent and fitted to our comfort, or stretched into hopes of full holiness that lose us in theosophical dreams contrary to self-knowledge.
The Moral law (n.) by itself promises no happiness at all, for nothing in the order of nature ties happiness to obeying it.
The Moral law (n.) does not satisfy our longing for happiness; it severely restricts our unbounded longing for happiness to conditions.
The Moral law (n.) in us promises nothing for sure and threatens nothing; it demands selfless respect, and only once that respect rules does it grant us a few feeble glances into the realm beyond the senses.