Duty (n.) is the obligation to act in reverence for law.
Duty (n.) is what the law is called for a will that carries a wish against it: the action requires an inner but intellectual constraint.
Duty (n.) offers itself on its own to everyone; what brings true lasting advantage is shrouded in impenetrable obscurity and needs much worldly prudence.
Duty (n.) derived from feeling would turn what only reason can think into an object of sensation, leaving a mechanical play of refined inclinations quarreling with coarser ones.
Duty (n.) is action with every inclination excluded, and so it carries necessitation in its very concept: being determined to act however reluctantly it is done.
Duty (n.) and obligation are the only names we may give our relation to the moral law, even though our own reason is the one giving it.
Duty (n.) is a yoke, but a gentle one, because reason itself lays it on us.
Duty (n.) is a sublime, grand name that flatters nothing and threatens nothing, but simply puts forth a law before which all inclinations fall silent even while they secretly work against it.
Duty (n.) commands a submission of the heart that lasts, because it carries principles with it; elevation of soul is fleeting and transitory, a mere burst of emotion.
Duty (n.) in its holiness asks us to put everything second to it, knowing we can because our own reason commands it, and so to raise ourselves entirely above the world of sense; any flattering thought of merit already mixes in self-love.