Pleasure (n.) is the presentation of an object's or action's agreement with the subjective conditions of life.
Pleasure (n.) differs from pleasure only in degree, never in kind: whether a gratification comes from understanding or sense, all that matters is how intense, how long, how easily got, how often repeated.
Pleasure (n.) is like gold: whether dug from the mountains or washed from the sand, it is all the same so long as it is accepted everywhere at the same value.
Pleasure (n.) of the refined kind — joy in fortitude, in cultivating talents — is still pleasure; calling it a different kind of will is like dabblers who refine matter until they get dizzy and think they have made spirit.
Pleasure (n.) earns the name refined because it is more in our control, does not wear out, strengthens our feeling for more of it, and cultivates us while it delights.
Pleasure (n.) in a moral action is not its cause but its consequence: reason's direct determination of the will produces the liking, not the other way round.
Pleasure (n.) and displeasure constitute the absolute, because they are life itself.
Pleasure (n.) always dispels a displeasure; a life of nothing but pleasures would contain no pleasure at all, for no one could feel it.