A Performative (n.) asks what it means for a thing to be 'done' by a word — or 'done in' by one.
The Performative (n.) bleeps 'abortion' as if the word performed the act when magically viewed, and treats saying 'I am homosexual' as a homosexual act.
The Performative (n.) depends on failure, Derrida claims: the chance of going wrong is the very force and law of its emergence.
A Performative (n.) succeeds only by repeating a coded, iterable formula — every 'I open this meeting' is a citation, and intention can no longer govern the whole scene.
A Performative (n.) does not end with the utterance; it goes on signifying in spite of its author, sometimes against the author's most precious intentions.
The Performative (n.) draws its force, for Bourdieu, from social power and its contexts of authority; for Derrida, from the utterance's break from all prior context.
A Performative (n.) to the extent it is conventional must be repeated to work — bound to no context in particular, though always found in some context or another.
A Performative (n.) succeeds — always only provisionally — not because intention governs it but because it echoes prior actions and accumulates the force of authority through citation.
A Performative (n.) is not a singular act used by an established subject but one of the influential rituals by which subjects are formed and reformulated.
The Performative (n.) that is tacit establishes a practical sense for the body — not only what it is, but how it can or cannot negotiate space, its 'location' among cultural coordinates.
A Performative (n.) produces what it names — yet that power is derivative: resignification, not creation ex nihilo; an act apart from sanctioned convention is a vain effort.
The Performative (n.) needs a historicity of force: no term works performatively without an accumulating and dissimulating history.
A Performative (n.) does not merely refer but helps make what it enunciates; 'This is Aristotle' does not bring Aristotle into being — so performativity is not rigid designation.