Sensation (n.) is the only way we know any other finite thing exists: only when it acts on us and makes itself perceived.
Sensation (n.) shows us spirit as surely as matter: in seeing something outside me, I know even more certainly that something inside me sees.
Sensation (n.) is an impression or motion in some part of the body that makes itself noticed in the understanding — and ideas begin exactly when it does.
Sensation (n.) is inconceivable except by contact or by the impulse of particles — Locke invites anyone who can make another way intelligible to do so.
Sensation (n.) and its cause are two ideas so distant that no two can be more so: knowing the figure and motion of a blade gives no idea of the pain it causes.
Sensation (n.) and reflection are the only two fountains; search your mind as hard as you like and you will find nothing that did not come in by one of these two doors.
Sensation (n.) has no conceivable connexion with the motion that causes it: no impulse of body resembles a colour or a smell, so we can only call it the arbitrary appointment of an all-wise Agent.