Definitions HQ

Man (n.) stays ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the same man not by keeping his matter but by one continued life passing through constantly fleeting particles.

Man (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the ordinary idea is a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought and reasoning, joined to substance.

Man (n.) stands ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠much nearer to the lowest state of being, that which approaches nearest to nothing, than to the infinite being of God.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠one person carrying an almost infinite number of relations at once — father, son, enemy, subject, judge, client, islander, master, bigger, younger.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠partly made by the body: a prince's soul, with all its princely thoughts, poured into a cobbler would not make another man.

Man (n.) taken ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠as a species fixed by a hidden real essence stands for we know not what, so it is impossible to affirm with certainty that all men are rational.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠God's property, made to last during his maker's pleasure and not another man's — which is why no one may use another as if made for his uses.

Man (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the question whether a drill or a monstrous foetus is one asks after a real essence the speaker supposes the name to stand for, not after agreement with his own complex idea.

Man (n.) differs ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠exceedingly from some animals, but compare some men with some brutes and it will be hard to say whose understanding is clearer or larger.

Man (n.) may ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠as well be Plato's body of a certain shape and outward appearance as Aristotle's body joined to the faculty of reasoning, unless the name is supposed to stand for something other than what it signifies.

Man (n.) may ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be better defined by Plato's featherless biped than by reason, since shape appears first and reason in some never — else how excuse those who kill monstrous births for their shape?

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠"rational animal" to one and "featherless two-legged animal with broad nails" to another — so the same individual will be a true man to one which is not so to the other.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠in all probability one of the lowest of all intellectual beings — the Creator's power was hardly all laid out on so mean and impotent a creature.

Man (n.) under ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠our nominal essence yields almost no certain general truths, for we cannot affirm that all men sleep by intervals, that no man can be nourished by wood or stones, or that all men will be poisoned by hemlock.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a species fixed by nature: it has been seriously debated whether a foetus born of a woman were a man, to be nourished and baptized — which could not be if the essence were nature's making.

Man (n.) depends ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠on what you put into the idea: add laughter and rational discourse and you can "demonstrate" infants are not men; leave out shape and a man may be four-footed.

Man (n.) has ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠borders no one can find in nature: hairy shaped creatures without speech, "naturals" with our shape but no reason, reported creatures with reason and tails — whether these are men is a question only about the definition of a word.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠measured, in practice, only by his outside: lengthen the ears, flatten the nose, and men begin to boggle; make the head a beast's and it is "demonstration" that there is no soul.

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a word whose borders no definition has fixed: had Licetus's monster with a man's head and hog's body lived and spoken, would it have been murder to destroy it, or must the bishop be consulted whether it were man enough for the font?

Man (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠decided by shape, whatever the definitions say: a creature with language and reason but not our shape would hardly pass for a man — had Balaam's ass discoursed rationally all his life, no one would have allowed him the name.