Desire (n.) is a name with a history', which is to say that its status is fundamentally discursive.
Desire (n.) is a product of discursive activities that create the space of social reasoning in a given historical period.
Desire (n.) is an effect of power, a danger which must be criticized, while pleasure is unencumbered by its limitations.
Desire (n.) is not prior to and constitutive of culture, nor it it responsible for bringing the subject into being (a la hegel or psychoanalysis). Rather, desire is something that is only intelligible within, and produced by, discursive practices and formations... in other words, power precedes both desire and the subject.
Desire (n.) is not something that is repressed because the law (which is capable of repressing) constitutes both desire and the lack on which it is predicated. As such, the power relation is already present where there is desire so it is an illusion to denounce this relation for a repression exerted after the event.
Desire (n.) is not something that manifests internally, rather it is a function of discourse and power.
Desire (n.) is pathological and always already imbued with oppression, unlike pleasure, which is never pathological. To desire is already to be subjectively policed: 'Tell me what your desire is and I will tell you who you are, whether you are normal or not, and then I can qualify or disqualify your desire'.
Desire (n.) cannot be contrary to nature since it was given to man by nature itself.
Desire (n.) is that site through which individuals make themselves subjects of specific regimes of power/knowledge.
Desire (n.) is the inadvertent consequence of the law. And insofar as the law is reproduced through given discursive practices, these latter participate in the cultural production of desire.