556 definitions
The book's index
Writing and Difference
302 concepts · 556 definitions
- absence2
- absolute idea1
- alienation1
- alter ego1
- alterity1
- anxiety1
- apparatus1
- appresentation1
- archaeology1
- archaic1
- archi-trace1
- archive1
- art1
- articulation1
- aufhebung1
- beauty2
- Being8
- body2
- book6
- breaching1
- caesura1
- censorship1
- center5
- cogito2
- coherence1
- commentary2
- communication1
- compromise1
- confluence1
- consciousness1
- constitution1
- continuum1
- creation1
- crisis1
- criticism4
- cruelty3
- dance1
- danger1
- Dasein1
- death6
- decision1
- decoding method1
- defecation1
- deferral1
- deferred action1
- definition1
- delay1
- Demiurge1
- desire3
- differance4
- difference6
- dionysian excitement1
- Dionysus1
- disciple1
- discourse4
- disease1
- dissension1
- divine1
- dream5
- dream writing1
- dream-work1
- dreamer1
- dualism1
- duration1
Writing (n.) is never identical to itself, except in Mallarmé's unrealized Book.
Writing (n.) is secondary, yet nothing has occurred before it.
Writing (n.) is all trash, and whatever dispossesses me of it soils me: I relinquish all that is proper to me.
Writing (n.) is a drawing back from one's own writing, letting it make its way alone and unarmed.
Madness (n.) is never mad enough to make a good example of doubt: the madman is not always wrong about everything.
Madness (n.) is as much alienation as inalienation: it is the work, or the absence of the work.
Madness (n.) is what by essence cannot be said: it is the absence of a work.
Madness (n.) is, in every sense of the word, only one case of thought, within thought.
God (n.) commands while hiding his face, and so is at once more and less a face than all faces.
God (n.) is the proper name of what deprives us of our own nature and our own birth, and so has always spoken before us, on the sly.
God (n.) is a sin against the divine, and the essence of guilt is scato-theological.
God (n.) is false value: the initial worth of what is born, which becomes Value because it doubles a true value that never existed.
Being (n.) is not above the existent, nor beside it, since beside it would make it another existent.
Being (n.) never is, never shows itself, and is never present, outside difference.
Being (n.) is the other of thought: it is what it is only by the letting-be of thought, and thought and Being are the same without being identical.
Being (n.) is repetition's own name: the form in which life and death merge endlessly in the word.
Language (n.) is the break with madness, separated from madness only by itself, like the transparent sheet Joyce names.
Language (n.) lights up Being and hides it in one and the same gesture.
Language (n.) is probably the only fact ultimately to resist all parenthesis.
Language (n.) arises with the sun: it has already awakened as a fall into light.
Violence (n.) without a victim is also violence without an author, since all egos are others for others.
Violence (n.) comes before ethics: a transcendental, pre-ethical violence sets up the very relation that ethical nonviolence later answers.
Violence (n.) did not exist before speech, though speech is its first defeat.
Violence (n.) is first the neutralization of desire: the solitude of a mute glance, a face that does not speak.
Death (n.) strolls between letters: to write is to have the courage to lose one's life.
Death (n.) is not something we risk in playing with machines; it is the origin of machines.
Death (n.) cannot be reconciled with God as positive presence: infinite alterity as death and as presence cannot be one.
Death (n.) is an articulated form of our relation to the other: I die only of the other, through him, for him, in him.
Philosophy (n.) is perhaps a gigantic confession: by excluding madness to calm itself, it betrays itself.
Philosophy (n.) lies between original tragedy and messianic triumph: there violence is returned against violence within knowledge.
Philosophy (n.) has always lived knowing itself to be dying, silently confessed beneath every claim to a perennial philosophy.
Philosophy (n.) is conceived from its Greek source: its founding concepts are Greek, and to philosophize is to speak within that medium.
Speech (n.) is stolen from language, and so stolen from itself, from a thief who has always already lost it as property.
Speech (n.) never belongs to the one who speaks: the words I have found are repeated before they are mine.
Speech (n.) is realized without defect only in God, as the presence and origin of writing.
Speech (n.) figures in dreams much as captions do in comic strips, its phonetic text secondary to the picture.
Time (n.) in its pure state is the atemporal, the eternal; its truth is not temporal.
Time (n.) is violence: it lets the other appear only by hiding what the other is.
Time (n.) is the economy of a system of writing.
Time (n.) as irreversible succession is only the epidermis of the universe; its truth is absolute simultaneity.