423 definitions
The book's index
The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius
328 concepts · 423 definitions
- accident1
- action2
- adversity1
- affectation1
- affection1
- affirmation1
- alienation1
- amor fati1
- anger2
- animal1
- annoyance1
- anxiety1
- aphorism1
- appropriate action1
- assent2
- attachment1
- authorship1
- beauty1
- benefactor1
- benefit1
- benevolence2
- bloodsport1
- body2
- book1
- border1
- boredom1
- brotherhood1
- busyness1
- categorical imperative1
- certainty1
- chance1
- change of mind1
- charity1
- charm1
- circumstance1
- city1
- comet1
- commentary1
- common good1
- community1
- company1
- complaint1
- confession1
- conformity1
- conqueror1
- conquest1
- consciousness1
- consent1
- consolation1
- contemplation1
- contentment1
- conversion3
- Correction1
- counsel1
- courage1
- court1
- crime1
- curiosity1
- cynic1
Life (n.) is not made for delicate souls: it splashes you as in the baths, shoves you as in a crowd, muddies you as on a wet road.
Life (n.) is not something to be saved but something to be spent in the worthiest way.
Life (n.) cannot be made worse by anything that does not make the man himself worse.
Life (n.) is like a song or a dance: a string of instants performed one after another, and the better each is isolated, the better the whole is mastered.
Philosophy (n.) begins with the awareness of our weakness and our incapacity in the things that matter.
Philosophy (n.) cannot be translated, any more than poetry can.
Philosophy (n.) is proven at table and at home, not in the lecture hall: eat, drink, marry, raise children and live as a citizen — then we will see what you learned.
Philosophy (n.) is not wearing the cloak or sleeping on the ground, but straightening out one's character — in simplicity, not in display.
Death (n.) put Alexander of Macedon and his mule-driver in the same state: both were taken back into the seeds of the universe, or both scattered among the atoms.
Death (n.) holds no terror for one who takes in the whole of time and the whole of being at a single glance.
Death (n.) has nothing fearful in it; what is fearful is the judgment that death is fearful.
Death (n.) turns, in the later Meditations, into a deliverance to be awaited patiently: release from a human world in which moral life is forever thwarted.
Stoicism (n.) has more goodness and gentleness than any other school, and more love for human beings: its aim is to be useful, to everyone in general and to each in particular.
Stoicism (n.) cannot be escaped: even if the universe were a chaos of atoms we would still have to live by reason — so it is impossible not to be a Stoic.
Stoicism (n.) is at bottom the mastery of one's inner discourse: everything in a life depends on how one tells things to oneself.
Stoicism (n.) is often called a philosophy of self-love, but its keynote is love of the All: to be a Stoic is to realise that no being is alone.
Wisdom (n.) held for a single instant makes a person no less happy than wisdom held for all eternity.
Wisdom (n.) can be summed up as always wanting the same thing and always refusing the same thing.
Wisdom (n.) cannot be bought with the master's furniture: one admirer paid 3,000 drachmas for Epictetus's clay lamp, hoping to soak up his wisdom by reading under it.
Wisdom (n.) meant, in Aeschylus' world, knowing one's place in society and in the world with modesty — a sense of human limits.
Soul (n.) is a little thing carrying a corpse around.
Soul (n.) must be questioned: will you ever be good, simple, one and naked, brighter than the body around you?
Soul (n.) for Plato is a republic in which reason rules the lower parts like a philosopher-king; for Epictetus impulse and desire are not lower parts at all but acts of reason itself.
Soul (n.) modifies itself: whether it is troubled or at peace is its own doing, never the doing of things.
Virtue (n.) is no contest for some ordinary prize: what the struggle decides is whether you will be sane or insane.
Virtue (n.) moves neither up nor down nor in a circle like the elements, but along a straight road — something divine and hard to picture.
Virtue (n.) first meant, as the Greek arete, not good conduct but nobility, excellence, distinction; the Stoics kept the nobility and moved it into the purity of one's intentions.
Virtue (n.) is its own reward — a noble principle, yet it still speaks of a reward, and so risks having us watch ourselves do good.
Goodness (n.) can be nothing but total generosity with no glance back at itself: to watch yourself doing good is already to strike a pose.
Goodness (n.) can be sensed as you approach a good person, as surely as you smell someone who smells bad.
Goodness (n.) at its most solid rests on perfect boredom, and on a clear view that the whole world is frivolous and without substance.
Nature (n.) stripped of the adjectives our blind anthropomorphism pins on it — terrifying, hideous, repulsive — appears naked, in all its savage beauty.
Nature (n.) has nowhere outside itself to throw its waste, so it turns its own detritus back into the stuff of new beings.
Nature (n.) and reason are one thing for the Stoics: the world grows (physis) according to a method built into it (logos).
Philosopher (n.) proves himself the way a carpenter does — not by lecturing on carpentry but by building the house: eat, marry, raise children, put up with insults and an unreasonable brother.
A Philosopher (n.) is a non-sage who knows it: the one middle term between the sage and the fool who does not know his state.
A Philosopher (n.) in antiquity was not a theorist but someone who lived like one: Cato the Younger never wrote a treatise and was a Stoic all the same.