Edmund Husserl (n.) is incorrect in his analysis of our consciousness of time. He failed to realize that time is always already something for us before explicit consciousness. It is already ambiguously at work in our environment before we have noticed it at all.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrong in believing that the reality of a thing is simply to appear as a phenomenon for human consciousness. In fact, a thing is not simply an object for consciousness. It is an event. If we say ?there is a city called beirut, it is not.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is a limited thinker whose account of intentionality is restricted to its phenomenal manifestation as the structure of perceptual comportment. A perceptual comportment cannot be a primary field of research because it is itself founded.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrong when he analyzes our consciousness of podiums and desks, for he failed to realize that these things are always already something for us before all explicit consciousness.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrongheaded insofar as he sees intentionality itself uncritically, never asking about the side of intentionality that withdraws from visibility.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is guilty of having reduced entities to their various surface profiles, and in this way caricatured or dehydrated the things of the world.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is responsible for transforming Brentano’s idea of intentionality from a representation (a presence of something before the human mind) into an objectifying act, including not just theoretical awareness, but also such obscure intentions as wishes, fears, confusion, and anger.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is responsible for having walled philosophy off from the natural sciences by suggesting that the first reality of a thing is to appear as a phenomenon for human consciousness. Any existence of things outside consciousness is secondary.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is trapped by bad metaphysics, where reality means what is present for human consciousness; however, human consciousness would not be possible unless it happened in an “opening” or “clearing” of some sort with some perpetual play of light and shadow.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is not really concerned with asking about the being of things; he is only concerned with how things can be made the object of a possible rigorous philosophy.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is guilty of having turned toward idealism—placing emphasis on human consciousness rather than on the world itself.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrong in that, by reducing everything to its appearance, to phenomena, his phenomenology, while claiming to be returning “to the things themselves” (Husserl’s favorite motto), it does such obvious injustice to the things themselves.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is on the wrong path and loses the question of being by reducing the things to phenomena and appearances without consciousness.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrong in that where he saw the problem of science to be naturalism (in favor of consciousness), the problem is the dominance of any theory that reduces objects to consciousness, when in fact they are events.
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrongheaded in that his phenomenology puts essence before existence, turning the whole world into nothing but a series of essences, and in this way stifles the existence of the thing, turning things into some kind of ‘what.’
Edmund Husserl (n.) is wrong that what comes first are phenomena that appear to consciousness. As the famed tool-analysis example shows, phenomena are only rare cases of visible things emerging from a dominant silent background of equipment.