Punishment (n.) is no deterrent to crime — no punishment has ever possessed enough power of deterrence to prevent the commission of crimes. On the contrary, whatever the punishment, once a specific crime has appeared for the first time, its reappearance is more likely than its initial emergence could ever have been.
Punishment (n.) may be inadequate to crimes of such magnitude — but that cannot mean that he who murdered millions should for this very reason escape it.
Punishment (n.) is necessary, said Grotius, to defend the honor or authority of the one who was hurt, so that failure to punish may not cause his degradation.
Punishment (n.) is the right of the criminal — of which he is robbed when judges pardon murder in inverts and treason in Jews as racial predestination.
Punishment (n.) is the alternative to forgiveness but not its opposite: both try to end what would otherwise go on forever.