Being (n.) swallows everything once taken as being-itself: whatever differs from being is not, so all things are one.
Being (n.) remains, even for Aristotle, the everlasting question — sought of old, now and forever, and always offering no way out.
Being (n.) is said in many ways, as 'healthy' is — of a diet, a complexion, a body — yet all point to one centre, which is substance.
Being (n.) has as many senses as there are ways of saying something about a thing — what it is, how much, of what kind, where, when, doing, suffering.
Being (n.) adds nothing: "one man" and "an existent man" say the same, because even a mere what is already thought as in some sense being.
Being (n.) cannot be a genus, because every difference that divides a genus must itself be — and a genus cannot be predicated of its own differences.
Being (n.) is not itself a being: the word, uttered nakedly, signifies nothing — it only co-signifies a combining that cannot be thought without the things combined.
Being (n.) signifies no fact at all as the bare word 'to be': it is a copula, unthinkable apart from the things it joins.
Being (n.) is transcendent" because it is neither an entity nor a class of entities. In this sense, Being lies "beyond" all entities.
Being (n.) is the emptiest word we own: for Aristotle, each climb from species to genus sheds some information, so the notion that fits everything says almost nothing.
Being (n.) in itself is nothing: it is not a being, not a thing, nor any property of things — yet when I say 'is', I understand something by it after all.
Being (n.) is divided broadly into accidental being (on kata symbebekos), being according to the categories, potential and actual being (on dynamei kai energeia), and being in the sense of being true or false (on hos alethes).