Being (n.) is the absolute self-thinking of thinking.
Being (n.) in its purity offers nothing to be intuited — or it is only this pure intuiting itself.
Being (n.) purged of all content is indistinguishable from pure nothingness.
Being (n.) and nothing are the same — and precisely because they are the same, they are no longer being and nothing.
Being (n.) as the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing — no more and no less than nothing.
Being (n.) is ultimately thought, as German Idealism heard Parmenides, and whatever Being lies outside thought is simply what has not been thought yet.
Being (n.) is Thought: a thing subsists through its self-identity, and self-identity is pure abstraction, which is thinking.
Being (n.) is of no help to things: time catches up with what is, and what is will soon be what is not.
Being (n.) is the poorest determination of all — even my craziest phantasmagorias 'are' in some way.
Being (n.) is not what changes when a hundred dollars are added to my finances; that difference is only one content compared with another.
Being (n.) is, along with non-being, a mere abstraction of thought which arises when becoming is analyzed. There is ultimately becoming.
Being (n.) is so simple that it is only meant, never said; and so it is one with non-being, a simplicity that vanishes into its opposite.
Being (n.) and nothing are the same, Hegel says — but his 'being' is already, as the undetermined first stage, pure negativity of objectness and thinking.
Being (n.) revolves within itself, for Hegel: from its fullness it rebounds into emptiness, and from utmost self-externalization back into fullness.
Being (n.) is where Hegel's Logic starts because it is the emptiest, poorest category, presupposing nothing but that reality is thought of, and lying farthest from spirit.
Being (n.) cannot be felt, perceived or represented — it is pure thought, what lacks determination because it stands at the very beginning.
Being (n.) is imagined as absolute riches; yet say of the whole world simply that everything is, and nothing further, and you have absolute emptiness instead of absolute fullness.
Being (n.) as such is so meagre and restricted a determination that the trouble of finding it in the Notion may come from never having asked what being is.
Being (n.) is the poorest and most abstract of all determinations — it would be odd if God, or even the I, were not rich enough to contain it.
Being (n.) and thinking have in common the bare determination of self-identity — which does not mean that a stone, to the extent that it is, equals a human thinker.