Freedom (n.) is ultimately not freedom to enjoy but freedom from enjoyment.
Freedom (n.) at its supreme moment sets its object free, 'absolute' in the old sense of absolvere, letting go.
Freedom (n.) turned out, so cynical Western observers said of 1989, to be mostly a craving for bananas and pornography.
Freedom (n.) is not a blissful neutral state of balance but the violent act that disturbs it — drawing the line of separation is what liberates.
Freedom (n.) in society is the order to embrace freely, as our own choice, what is imposed on us anyway — we all must love our country or our parents.
Freedom (n.) becomes a compulsion when we must choose without the knowledge a real choice requires: we are forced to live as if we were free.
Freedom (n.) and regulation are not opposites: we can choose freely only because a thick background of rules, civility and guaranteed healthcare lets us stop worrying.
Freedom (n.) of humankind was possible only against stable natural parameters: we could do as we liked only while we were marginal enough not to disturb them.
Freedom (n.) may not be the opposite of necessity; a man is most free when, instead of giving motives, he can only say "I am what I do."
Freedom (n.) came with a bill for Haiti's ex-slaves: first exploited, they then had to pay France for the recognition of their hard-won freedom.
Freedom (n.) begins with the opaque desire of the Other: knowing the Other wants something but not what, I am thrown back on myself to decide what I desire.
Freedom (n.) depends on our ignorance: if divine causality became directly observable, it would make us God's slaves and God a horrifying tyrant — an idea Kant took up.
Freedom (n.) at its highest, for Schelling, is the point where activity and passivity coincide, as when the artist in a creative frenzy experiences himself as the medium of an impersonal power.
Freedom (n.) is, in the 'risk society', not the freedom of one freely choosing one's destiny but the anxiety-provoking freedom of somebody who is compelled to make decisions without being aware of their consequences.
Freedom (n.) for Buñuel's priest Nazarín turns out to consist in the very humiliations and entrapments he had dismissed as distractions on the road to it.
Freedom (n.) and equality are not a mere mask over capitalist exploitation; the legal matrix of freedom and equality is the very form in which exploitation is exercised.
Freedom (n.) under capitalism is completed by its opposite: the worker's freedom to sell his labour is the very act in which he loses his freedom — and it is this freedom that closes the circle of bourgeois freedoms.
Freedom (n.) of belonging is a forced choice: you may choose, on condition you choose rightly — choose wrong and you lose choice itself; only the psychotic thinks he truly chooses, and the totalitarian enemy is the one presumed to have freely chosen the wrong side.