Knowing (n.) what you meant by "Add 1" was not an infinite number of acts performed when you gave the rule; and if it was a disposition, only experience can teach us what it was a disposition for.
Knowing (n.) a man's name is needed to say it as his name — but that does not imply that knowing is a process accompanying or preceding the saying.
Knowing (n.) one's own pain is an idle word: 'I must always know when I have pain' just makes 'know' redundant — say 'I have pain'.
Knowing (n.) something just is not thinking a thought.
Knowing (n.) and hearing cannot be looked at to see their difference, any more than pine wood and a table.
Knowing (n.) and hearing differ so enormously in occasion and use that the difficulty is finding a basis for comparison, not a difference.
Knowing (n.) that it's raining is said not to report the rain but to answer a report that has been questioned.
Knowing (n.) where a path leads is possessing something — and one can add, but I'm not telling.
Knowing (n.) is, in one sense, having learnt and not forgotten, and so hangs together with memory.
Knowing (n.) can mean being able, as knowing by heart, or being sure.
Knowing (n.) usually means having ascertained; no one ascertains that he has two hands, since he cannot doubt it.
Knowing (n.) is claimed where doubt is possible, while philosophers claim it exactly where no doubt arises and the words are superfluous.
Knowing (n.) is claimed of a well-known fact, as I know that is the Schneeberg, where saying I am certain would wrongly suggest doubt.
Knowing (n.) applies only where error is ruled out or where there are clear rules of evidence.
Knowing (n.) that someone is glad to see us makes us secure in our pleasure, which one might say is not knowing at all.
Knowing (n.) that he arrived, that 2 times 2 is 4, that he was in pain: the language-games differ far more than the sentences suggest.
Knowing (n.) is not a psychological state whose special features explain things; its logic is not that of a state.
Knowing (n.) denied of anger because it is inner would be absurd in court, like denying one can know whether hanging is punishment.
Knowing (n.) must license conclusions valid for all, so even absolute certainty of another's gladness does not count as knowledge in court.
Knowing (n.) is a psychological concept of a different kind from being certain or believing, with evidence of a different kind.