A Sentence (n.) as Wittgenstein writes it tries to say the whole thing, over and over, each one a view of one object from a different angle.
A Sentence (n.) usually just snips the air, like barber's scissors; only now and then does one step forward.
A Sentence (n.) owes much of what logicians say about it to the merely external fact that it is written in a line.
A Sentence (n.) that looks like one of our common sentences tempts us, gravely, into believing we know what to do with it.
A Sentence (n.) has life only as part of a language; whatever we imagine accompanying it in an occult sphere would just be another sign.
A Sentence (n.) is itself the picture of reality we were looking for — one which hasn't the slightest similarity with what it represents, which is why no shadow need be interpolated.
A Sentence (n.) can feel perfectly natural to us and yet have no use in our calculus of language.
A Sentence (n.) has no sense outside the language-game; it is not the logician's pure object, as a botanist sees a rose as plant, not as a delicate attention.
A Sentence (n.) has the sound and striding nature of a motion that begins and ends, setting up a sense apart from truth: the arrow, not the point.
A Sentence (n.) can look like one and not be one, like a steamroller design whose piston, on inspection, cannot move at all.