Matter (n.) is where the power lives: the energy that lets form advance is stored in the stuff, not in the shape.
Matter (n.) looks passive only to the man who orders it from a distance; the one who handles it has to prepare it, and prepared matter is full of life.
Matter (n.) is never raw: even clay in the marsh already has a form, built into its grain before anyone touches it.
Matter (n.) is not the opposite of form but the same system looked at through a microscope; form is what that system looks like from far away.
Matter (n.) that is inert cannot grow its stock of singularities; the living can, and that growth is what we call adaptation and invention.
Matter (n.) is an inexhaustible source of detail you could analyze forever, which is exactly why we do not perceive things as matter: we perceive the thresholds they hold.
Matter (n.) as pure indetermination is a fiction: what it stood for is an ordered series, or several series that clash.
Matter (n.) is nature as much as any forest: the poppyseed that runs like liquid when crushed, dirt, stone and steel all count.
Matter (n.) is the lowest thing to a spiritualist, who sees in it the opposite of the individual, and a productive source to a materialist, who finds it already individual.
Matter (n.) is the master of a stone and the tool of a man: in the mineral activity serves the lump, in man the lump is only the organ of activity.
Matter (n.) is, for Boscovich, nothing but points that pull when far apart and push when too close, and the turning point of that force is what gives the world structure.
Matter (n.) is spirit at rest, its activities held in equilibrium.
Matter (n.) is only matter if it carries energy at every point; a stone or lump in the clay is a stowaway that refuses to share the pressure.
Matter (n.) lost its own power to grow when the Greeks moved the force of change outside it; from then on it could only wait to be given form.
Matter (n.) is the opposite of individuality: so empty that you cannot even say self of it, and form touches it only as light touches the air.
Matter (n.) in Aristotle was a striving thing with its own dynamism; in Aquinas it is only a limit, the part that stops a form from being fully itself.
Matter (n.) is never dead: every scrap of it can feed, reproduce and grow, and individuality starts with the simplest forms.
Matter (n.) is what the philosopher of pure movement can only picture as life run down, the inert known as the dynamic gone stale.
Matter (n.) in Descartes included a subtle kind that stood in for the field: ingenious twisting tendrils from magnet poles, wrong only because he lacked one concept.
Matter (n.) as the old notion had it is a supersaturated solution waiting for its crystal: tense, calm on the surface, ready to flip into stability the moment a seed lands.