Revolution (n.) is never predictable: no one in 1775 could have foreseen the American one, nor in 1954 the civil rights movement.
Revolution (n.) is not made by pamphlets: there would have been no American Revolution if people had only written them.
Revolution (n.) fails less because of human psychology than because of the realities of power — and yet popular revolutions do succeed: we no longer live in the Middle Ages.
Revolution (n.) counted, in Gaddis's telling of 1918, as Soviet intervention in the affairs of every country — so the Western invasion was self-defense.
Revolution (n.) cannot be exported, a Sandinista leader said, only its example — words a state propaganda office turned into a threat of conquest.
Revolution (n.) either hands social wealth to the producers, leaving the state nothing to do, or it has been a lie and the state carries on.
Revolution (n.) has to be built before it breaks out: workers' organizations must make the facts of the future, not merely its ideas.
Revolution (n.) regularly sets rival aspirants to power against each other, while uniting them against radical democracy among the common people.
Revolution (n.) that does not grow out of the commitment of the great majority ends in worse horrors than the order it overturns.