Truth (n.) is not, as with heidegger, the idea of coming-into-presence, but rather is identified always with presence.
Truth (n.) cut off from knowledge is always taken as revelation, that is, as presence.
Truth (n.) is constituted by fiction, though Lacan uses fiction as a clue to truth.
Truth (n.) has always been assigned to the logos, so its history is the debasement of writing and its repression outside full speech.
Truth (n.) sought in books is nothing but lies and error, as Rousseau found when he looked for it there.
Truth (n.) is only one epoch in the growth of the sign, however privileged: a European one, and, as Nietzsche would say, an abbreviation of signs.
Truth (n.) is an infinite idea, and every finite totality or worldview is too small to hold it.
Truth (n.) is a possession that only forgetfulness lets us imagine we hold.
Truth (n.) in the shape of tautology is an empty husk; anyone who wants more gets illusions instead.
Truth (n.) is not the only value a speech can be judged by; force, a difference of force, can take its place.
Truth (n.) is what is repeated inside the repetition, the presence of the eidos signified.
Truth (n.) is nontruth: the withdrawal of presence is the condition of all truth, and nonpresence is presence.
Truth (n.) is two things at once: the unveiling of what lies concealed, and agreement between a representation and its thing.
Truth (n.) is spectral: part of it resists explanation because it returns as the specter of what was repressed.