Induction (n.) is the true nature of real numbers, the so of which we may say and so on.
Induction (n.) might go on as before if nature suddenly turned irregular — whether one would still call that induction is another question.
Induction (n.) is a process based on a principle of economy; we give up an hypothesis only for an even higher gain.
Induction (n.) in the form 'what has always happened will happen again' is not a premise we introduce into reasoning, but perhaps the natural law our inferring apparently follows.
Induction (n.) in its so-called law cannot be a law of logic, since it is plainly a proposition with sense, and therefore it cannot be a priori.
Induction (n.) is accepting as true the simplest law that fits our experience — a procedure with only a psychological justification, never a logical one.
Induction (n.) shows its true character when we fear what we expect: nothing could make me put my hand in a flame, though it is only in the past that I was burnt.
Induction (n.) in its so-called law can no more be grounded than particular propositions concerning the material of experience — one may say 'I believe in it', where believing has nothing to do with surmise.
Induction (n.) is not clearly the ground of the certainty that fire will burn me: the past burning may be only the cause of the certainty, not an argument that it has always burned me so it will now.