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The Cogito (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠only able to be performed if the one saying 'I think therefore I am' is qualified in a certain way by society as someone who is not mad.

The Cogito (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a discovery but a ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken afresh, a task of managing the distance that both separates and links thought-conscious-of-itself and whatever, within thought, is rooted in non-thought.

The Cogito (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠its modern form asks: what must I be, I who think and am my thought, in order to be what I do not think, and for my thought to be what I am not?

The Cogito (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠Descartes made error, dreams and madness harmless by showing them to be thought; the modern cogito instead prizes the distance between self-conscious thought and whatever in thought is rooted in non-thought — a ceaseless task, not an evident truth.

The Cogito (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠Descartes passed from 'I think' to 'I am' in the light of evidence because Classical discourse existed to link representation and being; no question about the mode of being of the thinker could be asked while that discourse lasted.

The Cogito (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠its modern form does not lead from 'I think' to 'I am': can I say I am this language I speak, this labour that eludes me before I begin it, this life that poses me for a moment on its crest? I am and I am not all this.