Perception (n.) of anything always implicitly refers to something already perceived before.
Perception (n.) is not in me, but in the objects that it apprehends.
Perception (n.) is assumed to belong to reality, yet it is precisely where the pleasure principle exercises its control.
Perception (n.) could be defined, in Freud's era, as a true hallucination — just as hallucination was a false perception.
Perception (n.) in any animal reaches far beyond what its needs require: even a crab takes in more of the world than its preformed responses could ever use.
Perception (n.) is a total relation to a picture in which man always recognises himself somewhere — sometimes in several places at once — and those images of his ego are what keep the world from going unreal.
Perception (n.) is accused of deception in the classic philosophical trick only so the philosopher can triumphantly show it finds the object where it is — a game played entirely in a space that is not, in essence, visual.