Definitions HQ

Intellectual intuition (n.) would ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠move from the whole to the parts, seeing a whole as a whole — where we can only build wholes up out of parts.

Intellectual intuition (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the divine power of seeing that creates what it sees, and the digital revolution dangles it before us — reality switched directly in the brain.

Intellectual intuition (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠original intuition, through which the very existence of its object is given — which, so far as we can see, belongs only to the original being.

Intellectual intuition (n.) would ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠belong to an understanding that intuits things immediately, and of that we have not the least concept.

Intellectual intuition (n.) belongs ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠to a divine understanding, which would intuit rather than think — whose representing would itself produce its objects — and would have no use for categories at all.

Intellectual intuition (n.) belongs ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠to the intellectus archetypus, the archetypal understanding we glimpse only by contrast with our own, which needs images (intellectus ectypus).

Intellectual intuition (n.) would ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠let an understanding say only: all the objects I know exist; contingency and necessity would never enter its imagination.

Intellectual intuition (n.) would ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠belong to an intuitive understanding, one in which, through self-consciousness, the whole manifold were given at once — it would intuit; ours can only think and must seek intuition in the senses.

Intellectual intuition (n.) would ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠belong to an understanding that cognizes its object not discursively through categories but in a non-sensible intuition — and such an understanding is itself a problem, whose possibility we cannot in the least represent.