Self-knowledge (n.) reaches only the self that appears: the mind, affecting itself, sees itself as it appears to itself, not as it is.
Self-knowledge (n.) from mere inner consciousness, without outer empirical intuition, has limits — the whole General Note is a warning against it.
Self-knowledge (n.) is told by reason's refusal to answer the curious questions beyond this life to turn away from speculation toward practical use.
Self-knowledge (n.) does not come from being conscious of myself as thinking; I know myself only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined with regard to the function of thought.
Self-knowledge (n.) is far more than the consciousness of oneself: to cognize myself I would need an intuition of the manifold in me, and that I have only as I appear.
Self-knowledge (n.) would be miraculous if what elsewhere takes such care to find — whether there is substance in intuition and whether it is simple — were given here directly, in the poorest representation of all, as if by revelation.
Self-knowledge (n.) through the bare I can give only tautological answers: having no correlate but myself, I substitute my concept and its unity for the properties of my self as an object, and presuppose what I wanted to know.