Dialectic (n.) is reason's secret, which it passes off as dogmatics, and reveals against its will only when it derives the direct opposite from an equally accredited principle.
Dialectic (n.) of pure reason deserves to be explained not only as an illusion to be dissolved but as a natural institution with a purpose.
Dialectic (n.) comes to nothing but idle chatter when logic is used to extend our knowledge, asserting or impeaching whatever one wants with some plausibility.
Dialectic (n.) of the natural kind is our disposition to argue against duty's strict laws until they suit our wishes — corrupting them at their very source.
Dialectic (n.) is natural to reason, so there will always be some metaphysics in the world; philosophy's first task is to block the source of its errors.
Dialectic (n.) is a logic of illusion — not a doctrine of probability, for the probable is truth known on insufficient grounds, defective but not deceptive.
Dialectic (n.) has inexhaustible tricks, but you need not refute each illusion: answer "not proved" and demand the deduction of its principles, which will never come.
Dialectic (n.) is what happens when one takes what is merely regulative for constitutive: it partly confounds reason's use in experience and partly divides reason against itself.
Dialectic (n.) has no victory you need fear: watch its conflict from the safe seat of critique — exhausting for the combatants, entertaining for you, and certainly bloodless.
Dialectic (n.) is general logic misused as an organon — the logic of illusion, a sophistical art for giving one's ignorance, and even one's intentional tricks, the air of truth.
Dialectic (n.) of pure reason is natural and irremediable — not a trap for bunglers or a sophist's invention, but a mirage that keeps leading reason on with false hopes even after it is exposed.