Thinking (n.) is an act conditioned by the understanding and its categories which are, precisely, rules.
Thinking (n.) is what Kant's motto demands: not 'Don't obey, think!' against 'Don't think, obey!' but 'Obey, but think!'
Thinking (n.) is free where cognizing is not: I can think whatever I like so long as I do not contradict myself, but to cognize an object I must prove its possibility.
Thinking (n.) is always a proof of limitation, as opposed to intuiting: a divine cognizer would not think at all, only intuit.
Thinking (n.) is the action of relating given intuitions to an object.
Thinking (n.) is not a product of the senses and is not limited by them; but it is not on that account capable of any pure use without them, for it is then without an object.
Thinking (n.) in general has a logical exposition that is falsely held to be a metaphysical determination of the object.
Thinking (n.) taken by itself is nothing but the sheer spontaneity of combining the manifold of a merely possible intuition — it presents no subject at all.
Thinking (n.) well obeys three maxims: think for yourself, think from the standpoint of everyone else, and always think consistently — the last being the hardest, reached only by uniting the other two.
Thinking (n.) for oneself is how principles are first found; afterward one finds them everywhere in others' books, where no one — not even their authors — saw them before.
Thinking (n.) is uniting representations in a consciousness — which is to say, thinking is the same as judging.