Truth (n.) is something finite men may have a notion of, to regulate their minds, without being capable of possessing it.
Truth (n.) has one final touchstone, reason, and that prerogative is what makes reason the highest good on earth.
Truth's (n.) land is an island, enclosed by nature in unalterable boundaries and surrounded by a stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion.
Truth (n.) of the empirical kind is secured against its kinship with dreams only by connecting appearances thoroughly according to laws in one experience.
Truth (n.) is the agreement of knowledge with its object — a definition so taken for granted that even the Copernican revolutionary never put it up for discussion.
Truth (n.) can have no general criterion, because truth concerns precisely the content that any general criterion must abstract from; to demand one is self-contradictory.
Truth (n.) of the transcendental kind precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible; it consists in the general relation of cognition to possible experience.
Truth (n.) rests on agreement with the object, which is why every understanding must agree about it: things that agree with a third agree with each other.
Truth (n.) rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria; so for Berkeley, whose appearances had nothing a priori beneath them, experience had to be sheer illusion.
Truth (n.) of a concept shows in its consequences: the more true consequences follow from it, the more indication of its objective reality.
Truth (n.) is the agreement of cognition with its object — and since the object of appearance is only a sum of representations, only the formal conditions of empirical truth can be asked about.