Compassion (n.) is usually taken as a starting fact of psychology, but it is infinitely mysterious.
Compassion (n.) is the one non-useless suffering — love — which is no longer suffering for nothing and immediately has meaning.
Compassion (n.) as suffering because the other suffers is only one aspect of responsibility, which holds even when he commits crimes.
Compassion (n.) is the astonishing transference from the memory of my own hunger to suffering for the hunger of another man.
Compassion (n.) of God is born in the severity of the tribunal: justice dispensed by the just becomes compassion, not by indulgence but through a judgement.
Compassion (n.) that is not the same for everyone arouses jealousy — that is, war; so it cannot be said of God, whose justice is higher than compassion.
Compassion (n.) does not begin in a sovereign ego that afterwards becomes compassionate; the ego is unique only by being obsessed by another first.
Compassion (n.) is insatiable, as Dostoevsky saw in Sonya before Raskolnikov — not inexhaustible: a hunger the other's presence feeds beyond all saturation.
Compassion (n.) has its source in non-indifference to the point of substitution — responsibility even for the outrage the other inflicts on me.
Compassion (n.) or "dying a thousand deaths" for another presupposes a more radical substitution: bearing his end as if one were guilty of causing it.