Meaning (n.) comes into being only through one who is not measured by being.
Meaning (n.) does not have to be: being can confirm thought, but thought thinks meaning.
Meaning (n.) begins before my Sinngebung — in the face, independent of my initiative and power.
Meaning (n.) of a text needs only that it agree with itself; its truth requires that it agree with reality.
Meaning (n.) cannot exist in being as such; only the self in the accusative, before every nominative, brings meaning into being.
Meaning (n.) covers over the traces of the saying that left it, as the perfect criminal tucks the traces of his violence into the natural folds of order.
Meaning (n.) in the German Meinung was felicitously rendered as "vouloir dire", meaning-to-say, joining will and the exteriority of language.
Meaning (n.) comes from an otherness that being perceived does not absorb: to mean is to teach or be taught, to speak or be sayable.
Meaning (n.) may not always be an event of being: in this being that we are, things come to pass in which our being does not count as first.
Meaning (n.) for intellectualism is perception's consolation prize: for God, with unlimited perception, understanding would just be perceiving.
Meaning (n.) never came to birth out of a meaningless being: there was no moment outside a historical position where language is spoken — language is the home of being.
Meaning (n.) is the face of the Other: it is not the sign that makes signification but signification — born face to face — that makes signs work.