Deception (n.) is in our very nature. Man did not acquire speech in order to reveal his thoughts but in order to conceal them.
Deception (n.) leaves the deceived wiser than the not-deceived, in the theater.
Deception (n.) at its surest is not exuberant mirth — which makes even a mediocre observer suspicious — but sound common sense, passionate reflection, and an open countenance.
Deception (n.) is the most good one man can do another, since the highest truth is that essentially I can do him no good — and if I told him so directly, he would be deceived into thinking he had learned it from me.
Deception (n.) works two ways: you can be deceived by believing the false, but also by not believing the true.
Deception (n.) takes no time — one can be deceived instantly and stay so for years; it takes time to notice.
Deception (n.) stretches exactly as far as truth, and duplicity as far as honesty — there is no absolute criterion, which is precisely how existence tests whether you are mistrustful or loving.
Deception (n.) proves too much by its possibility: if it means one should believe nothing, it equally means one should believe everything; even the worst man's baseness might be only an appearance.
Deception (n.) is, in the infinite sense, only self-deception — giving up love itself; to be killed is no danger, nor is the deception the world talks about.
A Deception (n.) who cunningly wins the true lover's love has wasted his art: the true lover loves everyone, so he could have had that love far more simply.
A Deception (n.) who fools the true lover is like a man lying in a ditch who still believes he is riding: proud of loving no one in return, he does not see that loving without requital is what the lover counts his highest happiness.
Deception (n.) practised on the true lover is like calling it theft to put money into a man's pocket.
A Deception (n.) is punished by his success: like a madman who partly convinces a sane man and so never learns he is mad, his deception succeeds — and there is his perdition.
Deception (n.) practised on the true lover is really a quarrel over whether the deceiver can become the occasion of his fall — into childish wrangling, into asking for requital; the lover guards against it by loving the deceiver.
Deception (n.) lovingly practiced — confirming men in their cherished errors — is agreeable and lovable, and the deceived thank the deceiver as their greatest benefactor; but is it love to love, and be loved, in a deception?
Deception (n.) breeds reflective grief because it is so hard to prove: as long as it remains disputable, grief can find no rest.
Deception (n.) is for love an absolute paradox — a thing love cannot think and yet must attempt to think.
A Deception (n.) is just as well gone, so she should be glad he left — and yet it is a profound sorrow that he was one; whether he really was is the unrest that keeps her grief in perpetual motion.
A Deception (n.) who must have known he was one from the beginning has in all likelihood never existed.
Deception (n.) needs a relation: could she hold fast to being absolutely nothing to him, there would be no deceit to suffer — but the thought instantly flips into its opposite.