Force (n.) is equally the soliciting force for the other, which only thereby becomes itself a soliciting force.
Force (n.) explains nothing: to explain a phenomenon by a force is a tautology.
Force (n.) splits the object into an outer show and an inner source, a split that in Hegel's argument can end only in inner necessity showing itself.
Force (n.) that has not expressed itself is only an abstract inner: it has being only in its expression, to which it must be solicited.
Force (n.) invoked to explain an appearance is an empty tautology — the force has exactly the content of its utterance, plus only the empty form of being inner.
Force (n.) are usually imagined each as a first, free and independent thing, meeting in matter as if by chance rather than passing into one another.
Force (n.) that solicit and are solicited have no substance of their own: what they are, they are only in their contact, each solely through the other.
Force (n.) is a category the understanding fixes as ultimate so that it can stop asking — and then imagines it implanted into matter from outside.
Force (n.) is no image of spirit, Hegel insists against Herder: it works blindly, not as purpose does toward a rational end, and is always limited to particular contents.
Force (n.) is finite because it needs another to carry it — magnetic force needs iron, whose colour and weight are indifferent to magnetism — and another to solicit it.
Force (n.) of the primitive kind — the one force behind gravity, magnetism, memory and will — would be only an empty abstraction, as lacking in content as the thing-in-itself.
Force (n.) is not the basis of law but only the necessary moment in the passage out of appetite and selfish isolation — the social life of peoples begins in subjugation.
Force (n.) consists precisely in its utterance, so knowing the totality of its utterances as law is knowing the force itself — the unknowable "force in itself" is an empty abstraction.
Force (n.) exists simply and solely in its expression, which is at the same time a supersession of itself — so its realization is at the same time the loss of reality.
Force (n.) is the unconditioned universal which is equally in its own self what it is for an other... or which contains the difference in its own self-for difference is nothing else than being-for-another.
Force (n.) acts blindly: it needs solicitation from outside, and its content is restricted and contingent — not yet Concept and purpose; to grasp God as force, like Herder, is a confusion.