Virtue (n.) admits no more-or-less: there is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality.
Virtue (n.) talk easily passes into mere declamation, because it addresses the individual's caprice rather than any definite content.
Virtue (n.) is not doing a good deed but ethical virtuosity — the good way of acting become a fixed element of character.
Virtue (n.) only believes in the good it fights for — and the good brought into existence would be the end of its own activity.
Virtue (n.) in its theory is really a spiritual history of the natural in man — a catalogue of temperaments.
Virtue (n.) is always of limited reach: patriotism, love of family, moral rectitude — all serve ends negligible in the world as a whole.
Virtue (n.) of sacrifice, chastity, humility and the battle against the flesh means nothing to the Greek gods, for it rests on the breach between body and spirit.
Virtue (n.) soon grows tedious as a Stoic watchword — the True and the Good, wisdom and virtue, are uplifting, but since they produce no expansion of content, they soon become tedious.
Virtue (n.) of rulers is not enough once particularity is freed in civilized society — not sentiment but the form of rational law must hold the whole together.
Virtue (n.) fights like a knight a sham-fight he dare not let become serious, counting on a reserve to fall on the enemy from the rear — the good that fulfils itself without him.
Virtue (n.) in the strict sense flourishes only where the social order is undeveloped — heroes like Hercules make up by private genius for what the state cannot yet supply.
Virtue (n.) for the ancients was living by the customs of one's people; modern virtue is individualist self-denial, a retreat Hegel finds unacceptable.
Virtue (n.) is talked of most by the French, because among them the individual is more his own property; the Germans, more reflective, turn the same content into universality.
Virtue (n.) is what self-consciousness becomes on learning, in carrying out the law of its heart, that the good can be accomplished only through the sacrifice of the individual.
Virtue (n.) that exists only in intentions and dispositions, with outward behaviour not matching, is as hollow and empty as the behaviour — the way a man is in his actions, so he is within.
Virtue (n.) as Aristotle saw it, an interpenetration of reason and desire, is a seed of Hegel's thought, opposed both to hedonism and to Kant's sharp split between duty and inclination.
Virtue (n.) is not merely the combatant concerned to keep his sword bright: it started the fight to preserve the weapons — and must protect the enemy's weapons from its own attack, since all are noble parts of the good.
Virtue (n.) in the ancient world had a sure meaning rooted in the spiritual substance of the nation; the modern virtue that rails at the way of the world is a virtue in imagination and name only.