Innocence (n.) is merely non-action, like the being of a stone — not even that of a child.
Innocence (n.) in early religious painting is a merit that later ages surpassed in everything else and never regained once lost.
Innocence (n.) belongs only to inaction, Hegel says: to the being of a stone, but not even to that of a child.
Innocence (n.) in the idyll means knowing of nothing except eating and drinking — and only very simple foods at that; bread is probably post-idyllic.
Innocence (n.) belongs to the first, immediate self, which can be called 'innocent' but hardly 'good'; to be Self and Spirit it must first become an 'other' to itself.
Innocence (n.) of the childlike kind touches us only because it reminds us of what spirit must bring forth by its own labour — "become as little children" does not mean remain children.
Innocence (n.) belongs to the naive consciousness that wills the ethical order whole and so stays blameless — and for that very reason can never act; it has a horror of the schism action requires and knows itself only as the terrain or spectator of action.