Definitions HQ

Punishment (n.) without ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the idea of value is nothing but the arbitrary attachment of an evil to a forbidden act.

Punishment (n.) in ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠an unsettled society must make an example — punishment is itself an example against the example of crime.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a menace made good: if anyone disregards the known threat and commits the crime, the punishment must follow.

Punishment (n.) at ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠its most severe is to wander so far from thought and reason as to mistake an absurdity for the word of God.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not a negative answering a positive crime: crime is the negative, and punishment only the negation of a negation.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the criminal's own right: in his act, as a rational being, he set up a law, and consented to be placed under it.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠only the manifestation of the crime — its other half, necessarily presupposed in the first.

Punishment (n.) cannot ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be fixed by reason between forty lashes and thirty-nine, a year and a day less — and yet a lash, a cent, or a day too much is an injustice.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the crime's reflection into itself — the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it, after which the law falls quiet again and is vindicated.

Punishment (n.) explained ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠as rendering the criminal harmless or deterring others is a merely mechanical theory, like tracing the circulation of the blood to the heart's contraction.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not an alien violence the criminal suffers but the manifestation of his own deed; when he recognises this, he behaves as a free person.

Punishment (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the criminal's right, Hegel holds: to let him off as needing reform is to treat him not as a bearer of will but as a harmful animal to be made harmless.

Punishment (n.) seen ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠as willing a second evil because a first exists looks unreasonable — hence the theories of prevention, deterrence and reform; but the question is not evil and good, it is wrong and justice.

Punishment (n.) looks ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠to the criminal like a restriction of his freedom, but it is the manifestation of his own act; once he sees this, he bears himself as a free man.