A Thing (n.) is always a judgment: a singular that is inwardly a universal nature.
A Thing (n.) taken as a collection of 'free matters' ceases to be a One and becomes merely an enclosing surface.
A Thing (n.) in law is the external opposite of freedom — in which sense my own body and my life are things.
A Thing (n.) has no subjectivity, so it is external not merely to a subject but to itself.
A Thing (n.) is at once an Also — an indifferent medium of many properties — and a One that excludes others.
Thing (n.) is nothing but the contradiction between its oneness and its many properties, and that, Hegel says, is why it is appearance.
The Thing (n.) is raised to the level of a genuine 'also' since it becomes a collection of 'matters' and instead of being a 'one', becomes merely an enclosing surface.
The Thing (n.) involves the seed of its passing away in its very being. In other words, the hour of the things birth is the hour of its death.
A Thing (n.) such as this salt is white and also tart, also cubical: its properties share one Here without touching, held together only by the indifferent Also.
Thing (n.) with its properties is the rival of Hegel's vision: material reality as a peaceful, stable coexistence that rests on itself and needs nothing beyond it.
A Thing (n.) keeps its properties from collapsing, for consciousness, by 'in so far': white in so far as it is white, not cubical in so far as it is cubical.
A Thing (n.) is demolished by the very determinateness that constitutes its essence: it is for itself in so far as it is for another, and for another in so far as it is for itself.
The Thing (n.) it exhibits itself for the consciousness apprehending it in a specific manner, but is at the same time reflected out of the way in which it presents itself to consciousness and back into itself... in other words, it contains in its own self an opposite truth [to that which it has for the apprehending consciousness].