The Good (n.) in Greek thought is not the moral good but what is capable of something and makes another capable.
The Good (n.) is good painfully: everything that lives is fit, and so good, but its goodness hurts.
Good (n.) is to knowing what the sun is to seeing: as every eye is sunlike, all cognition is goodlike.
Good (n.) is not itself being but lies beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power — and from it the known receives not only its being known but its very being.
Good (n.) arrives as heritage — if all that is 'good' is a heritage, and its goodness consists in making authentic existence possible, then handing down a heritage takes shape in resoluteness.
Good (n.) in Plato's idea of the good does not mean the morally orderly but the valiant — what achieves what is proper to it; it is the primally potent that empowers Being to be idea.
The Good (n.) of Plato, the agathon, must stay empty of content: it is not a thing to define but the 'for the sake of' that is the source of all possibility — and the possible ranks above the actual.