Judgment (n.) is not true and false but true or false — a point Aristotle saw and contemporary logic no longer even notices.
Judgment (n.) is not the home of truth; to claim Aristotle for that thesis misunderstands the Greek idea of truth altogether.
Judgment (n.) takes apart what was already seen whole: I must have had the blackboard in view as something unitary before I can say what it is or isn't.
Judgment (n.) on one's age is decisive not because it is negative but because it evaluates at all — it fixes the price range the age belongs to, and instantly seems in the right.
Judgment (n.) collapses, once its root in the 'as' is forgotten, into binding and separating representations — and then into a calculus that no longer thinks about being at all.
Judgment (n.) split into a real psychical act and an ideal content is broken into two levels that can never be pieced back together into a knowing — which may be why two thousand years have made no headway.
Judgment (n.) is a trivial, exhaustively studied phenomenon, yet it returns us at a stroke — as everywhere in philosophy — to the expanse and uncanniness that profound boredom had opened.
Judgment (n.) is nothing but the way given cognitions are brought to the objective unity of apperception — that is what the "is" is for: to tell objective unity from merely subjective association.