Definitions HQ

Feeling (n.) tells ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠us what a thing is to us in contrast to sensation which tells us what a thing is or thinking which tells us what it is that a thing is.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠the unconscious conversion of instinctual impulses.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠one of the mind's strictly rational functions; together with thinking, the mind can balance rationality's global and analytic aspects.

Feeling (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be genuine without being private: calling the host's signed painting “beautiful” is not a lie but an act of adjustment.

Feeling (n.) pulled ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠too far into the object turns cold and “unfeeling”: it can pad a situation aesthetically but no longer speaks to the heart.

Feeling (n.) at ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠its most extraverted seems to have a process but no subject — there is feeling, but no longer anyone who feels.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠disturbed by nothing so much as thinking — “But I can't think what I don't feel.”

Feeling (n.) that ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠frees itself from every object and every traditional value leaves the unconscious thinking all the more enslaved to brute fact.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a kind of judgment — not of what a thing is but of whether to accept or reject it; even indifference is a feeling-tone and so a valuation.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a rational function: values are assigned according to the laws of reason just as concepts are formed by them.

Feeling (n.) when ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠abstract rises above the values of particular things into a mood that embraces them all and so abolishes them — as an abstract concept abolishes differences.

Feeling (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠never be classified, because classification is itself an intellectual act — and no basic function can be fully expressed by another.

Feeling (n.) kept ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠natural and supreme in social life leaves a man ever at war with himself — neither man nor citizen, of no use to himself or to others.

Feeling (n.) seems ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠merely momentary and personal only to the thinker, in whom it is fused with sensation; differentiated feeling can establish universal and permanent values.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠a rational function: a feeling of regret judges and values, while a "feeling" that shares will rise is really intuition.

Feeling (n.) can ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠be as logical, consistent and discriminating as thinking; it only looks irrational to the thinker, whose own feeling is primitive.

Feeling (n.) that ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠are wordless but suggestive are worth more than clever talk when the total reaction has no concepts at hand.

Feeling (n.) is ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠psychology's measuring rod: where physics measures quantities, psychology estimates intensities by valuation.

Feeling (n.) and ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠not theory changes attitudes: a statistical report on prisons puts you to sleep, a walk through one does not — and it was no theory that made the Buddha, but the sight of old age, sickness and death burned into his soul.

Feeling (n.) measures ⁠​‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​⁠how much a psychic content weighs; intellect alone gives meaning without value.